From msuinfo!agate!howland.reston.ans.net!usc!rpi!smythw Wed May 5 12:49:59 1993
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy.clipper,sci.crypt
Path: msuinfo!agate!howland.reston.ans.net!usc!rpi!smythw
From: smythw@vccsouth10.its.rpi.edu (William Smythe)
Subject: Re: I have seen the lobby, and it is us
Message-ID: <+r65=r-@rpi.edu>
Nntp-Posting-Host: vccsouth10.its.rpi.edu
Organization: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY
References: <1993Apr21.163929.21149@eff.org> <1993Apr22.043233.8855@uc.msc.edu> <Apr22.185314.14420@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 1993 17:32:20 GMT
Lines: 41
Xref: msuinfo comp.org.eff.talk:17402 alt.privacy.clipper:246 sci.crypt:15970

In article <Apr22.185314.14420@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> ns111310@LANCE.ColoState.Edu (Nathaniel Sammons) writes:
>1) I think that most of us can afford a stamp and an envelope, and the
>cost of printing out a letter.
>
>2) If some kind soul out there would write a letter, and upload it to
>the net, everyone could capture it, print it out, and snail-mail it
>out to their local congressional critter.
>
>BTW>> I'm working on one.

Dear Senator/Congressman/President {fill in the blank}

I am writing you to voice my strong opposition to President Clinton's Clipper
Chip initiative. This proposal to establish a secret government designed
cryptography chip with government key registration as the standard for voice
encryption is very disturbing. The idea that citizens must register their
secrets with the government just in case they are trying to keep them secret
is patently unAmerican. Additionally, the press release for this program
strongly implied that other forms of cryptography would be banned after the
Clipper Chip standard is in place. This latest attack on our civil rights is
deeply disturbing and is frankly a voting issue for me.

The presidents press release stated that the plan strikes a balance between the
legitimate needs of law enforcement and a citizens right to privacy but this
is not the case. The fact is that since other strong cryptographic equipment
is avalible the criminals, drug dealers and terrorists mentioned in the press
release will simply use non clipper cryptography. Meanwhile the average citizen
may gain no protection against warentless wiretaps by the government since the
government escrowed key is derived deterministicly from the unit serial number
which is broadcast by the chip durring its opperation. This seems like an
obvious back door for the NSA and law enforcement. If you still do nott
understand my objection to key registration, consider the way J. Edgar Hoover
blackmailed government officials like yourself; would you now use a phone to
transmit personal details of your life that the NSA and FBI have the keys to?


______________________________________________________________________________
Well heres a letter, I didnt spell check it since I dont know how in EMACS
so you might want to do that.

Bill Smythe

From msuinfo!uwm.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!noc.near.net!transfer.stratus.com!ellisun.sw.stratus.com!cme Wed May 5 19:12:54 1993
Path: msuinfo!uwm.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!noc.near.net!transfer.stratus.com!ellisun.sw.stratus.com!cme
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: Re: Write to Clinton
Date: 28 Apr 1993 19:51:56 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
Lines: 21
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <1rmn8s$3s6@transfer.stratus.com>
References: <1r74a4$h2t@transfer.stratus.com> <C64214.Epo@fig.citib.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com
Xref: msuinfo sci.crypt:15994 comp.org.eff.talk:17421

In article <C64214.Epo@fig.citib.com> gjb@fig.citib.com (Greg Brail) writes:
>>
>> 0005895485@MCIMAIL.COM (White House)
>
>Is this "White House e-mail address" really working yet? Someone
>posted such an address on CompuServe a few months ago, but apparently
>the White House wasn't really set up to recive hundreds (thousands?)
>of messages a day to that account and didn't want people to use it

The compuserve mailbox overflowed. This one doesn't.

I don't know how often they print and carry mail but I have received
confirmation of receipt within 2 hours of each message I've sent.

They *do* print it on paper and carry it over, BTW.

--
- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
- Carl Ellison cme@sw.stratus.com
- Stratus Computer Inc. M3-2-BKW TEL: (508)460-2783
- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298 FAX: (508)624-7488

From msuinfo!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!netcomsv!netcom.com!tenney Wed May 5 19:14:05 1993
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper,sci.crypt
Path: msuinfo!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!netcomsv!netcom.com!tenney
From: tenney@netcom.com (Glenn S. Tenney)
Subject: Hearing on 29 April 1993
Message-ID: <tenneyC62HqH.6s1@netcom.com>
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 1993 01:35:05 GMT
Lines: 105
Xref: msuinfo alt.privacy.clipper:205 sci.crypt:15858

I received a fax of a letter from Representative Markey (Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance) to Ron Brown (Secretary of Commerce). Since
encryption and the Clipper chip are raised in this letter, I felt it would be
of interest. I understand that on 29 April, Mr. Markey will be holding a
hearing on the questions raised in this letter. There may also be a follow-on
hearing dedicated to the clipper chip, but that's not definite.

I've typed in the letter, which follows. Any errors in transcription are
mine...

---
Glenn Tenney
tenney@netcom.com Amateur radio: AA6ER
Voice: (415) 574-3420 Fax: (415) 574-0546

------------------ letter of interest follows ----------------

April 19, 1993

The Honorable Ronald H. Brown
Secretary
Department of Commerce
14th and Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20236

Dear Secretary Brown:

As you know, I have long been interested in the privacy
and security of telecommunications transmissions and data in
a networked environment. Recent reports concerning the
Administration's endorsement of an electronic encryption
standard, based upon "clipper chip" technology, have raised a
number of related issues. The international competitiveness
of U.S. high tech manufacturers and the software industry is
a key factor that the government should consider when
addressing issues of encryption and data security. As the
nation moves forward in developing the national
communications and information infrastructure, security of
telecommunications transmissions and network data will be an
increasingly important factor for protecting the privacy of
users.

The "hacker" community can compromise the integrity of
telecommunications transmissions and databases linked by the
network. The people and businesses that use the nation's
telecommunications network and the personal computers linked
through it increasingly are demanding that information be
protected against unauthorized access, alteration, and theft.

I am concerned that the Administration's plan may mean
that to remain competitive internationally, U.S. companies
would be compelled to develop two products -- one for U.S.
government customers, and another for private, commercial
users who may want a higher encryption standard. This may
inadvertently increase costs to those U.S. companies hoping
to serve both markets. To assist the Subcommittee's analysis
of this issue, please respond to the following questions:

1. Has the encryption algorithm or standard endorsed by the
Administration been tested by any entity other than NSA, NIST
or the vendor? If so, please identify such entities and the
nature of testing performed. If not, please describe any
plans to have the algorithm tested by outside experts and how
such experts will be chosen.

2. Under the Administration's plan, what entities will be the
holders of the "keys" to decrypt scrambled data? What
procedures or criteria will the Administration utilize to
designate such key holders?

3. Does the encryption algorithm endorsed by the
Administration contain a "trap door" or "back door," which
could allow an agency or entity of the Federal government to
crack the code?

4. It is clear that over time, changes in technologies used
for communications will require new techniques and additional
equipment. How will encryption devices adapt to the rapid
advancement of telecommunications technology?

5. What additional costs would the proposed encryption place
on the Federal government? What is the estimated cost to
consumers and businesses which opt for the federal standard
in their equipment?

6. What is the Commerce Department's assessment of the
competitive impact of the Administration's endorsement of the
"clipper chip" technology on U.S. exports of computer and
telecommunications hardware and software products?

I would appreciate your response by no later than close-
of-business, Wednesday, April 28, 1993. If you have any
questions, please have your staff contact Colin Crowell or
Karen Colannino of the Subcommittee staff at (202) 226-2424.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Markey
Chairman

###
--
Glenn Tenney
voice: (415) 574-3420 fax: (415) 574-0546
tenney@netcom.com Ham radio: AA6ER

From msuinfo!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!sdd.hp.com!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!netcomsv!netcom.com!grady Wed May 5 19:31:38 1993
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc,comp.org.eff.talk,sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,alt.privacy
Path: msuinfo!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!sdd.hp.com!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!netcomsv!netcom.com!grady
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Subject: My letter about Clipper
Message-ID: <gradyC67p19.HoG@netcom.com>
Organization: capriccioso
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 1993 21:00:45 GMT
Lines: 117
Xref: msuinfo comp.security.misc:3571 comp.org.eff.talk:17426 sci.crypt:16005 alt.security.pgp:2757 alt.privacy:6693


The Honorable Dan Hamburg,
representing the 1st District

(attn: Paul Anderson, Legislative Aide,
Communications)

28 Apr 93

Re: President Clinton's "Clipper Chip" wiretap proposal

On April 16, 1993 the Office of the Press Secretary for President
Clinton announced an initiative to standardize communications
privacy through encryption using solid-state technology developed
by the National Security Agency. This chip ("The Clipper Chip"),
already proposed for inclusion by AT&T in several
telecommunications products, has a built-in 'back door' that permits
law enforcement agencies to monitor the messages undetectably.

The administration proponents argue that the "key" to the
telephone can only be obtained upon warrant from trusted escrow
houses and that this kind of monitoring capability is necessary to
prevent criminal conspiracy from flourishing.

I disagree strongly with this initiative for several technical and
social reasons.

Privacy is indeed desirable and we need technical and social measures
that can assure it. However, as historical events have shown we
need protection from the government as least as much as protection
from other citizens. Illegal wiretapping of the Weathermen as
revealed by Federal Judge Damon J. Keith (the 'Keith Case') in
1971, Richard Nixon's 'watch lists', and the notorious NSA project
Minaret and project Shamrock involving warrantless monitoring of
domestic individuals and organizations supports the idea that the
NSA deems its secretive national security mission more important
than the law or our individual civil rights. Nor is the NSA the only
agency that has disregarded our civil rights in search for 'national
security'. For example, in December 1974 Seymour Hersh reported
in the New York Times the details of Operation Chaos, an illegal
CIA spying program directed against Americans. The list is long of
government wiretap abuses.

Technically, the Clipper chip proposal is flawed because the
specifications for the chip remained classified, contrary to normal
scientific peer review standards. We citizens cannot verify the
correct functioning of this technology nor its capacity for its abuse of
our right to privacy. We must trust the NSA to exclusively guard
our civil rights, which we know is unwise.

Wiretapping now and under this new proposal can be done
undetectably. There is no technical means to assure us citizens that
the government has a proper warrant. The only means we citizens
have of currently assuring privacy, even from government
wiretapping, is through strong cryptography. And this initiative
explicitly questions our use of this strong cryptography in the
passage: "We [the administration] are not saying that every
American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable
commercial encryption product."

I disagree. I believe that we individual do have the right to be
secure in our papers and effects and our expressions of ideas
telephonically, digitally, or by any other means. I believe that the
government ought to regulate our overt actions in our dealings with
other people, not to regulate our private expression of ideas to
ourselves or to others.

This initiative even goes further to erode our right to privacy
because each encoded conversation will be tagged with a unique
serial number that would allow collection of warrantless collection
of conversations from the comfort of remote headquarters with just
the flick of a switch. This call 'tracking' is a potentially dangerous
new capability that the government wants in monitoring its citizens.
Under a recent Federal Court decision (the 'Steve Jackson Games'
case), the judge ruled that mere collection of digital messages
without a warrant was not the same as an 'intercept' which is
forbidden by Federal Law. This ruling coupled with the new
'serialized message' Clipper chip technology means that all of our
conversations can legally be collected and warehoused for use at any
future time. Although the initiative stresses that the inclusion of
Clipper technology into phones, modems, and computer networks is
purely voluntary (at this time), this serializing represents a dangerous
new capability for government intrusion into our unencumbered
expression of ideas.

And of course determined criminals can use technology developed
outside the United States to evade this new initiative anyway. The
administration's suggestion that this technology will thwart terrorist
or drug traffickers is grossly overstated and misleading.

We all don't want criminals to evade proper warrants with the new
secure encryption technologies, but the danger to our civil rights of
this new Clipper Chip initiative and the signs that the government
will use its wide dissemination to justify outlawing truly strong
cryptography 'to fight drug traffickers and terrorists' in the future, is
extremely troubling to me.

I would much prefer a that some criminals have secure conversations
than the bulk of our citizens having their constitutional right to
privacy reserved by the fourth and tenth amendment to the
Constitution eroded.

Funding for the Clipper chip initiative should be axed unless with
some reasonable certainty we citizens can assure ourselves of its
guarantee of due process and protection of our civil rights.
Congressman Edward J. Markey has also questioned the wisdom of
this proposal; you may want to contact his office to consolidate
information.

Very truly yours,

Grady Ward


--
grady@netcom.com 2EF221 / 15 E2 AD D3 D1 C6 F3 FC 58 AC F7 3D 4F 01 1E 2F


From msuinfo!agate!howland.reston.ans.net!darwin.sura.net!news-feed-1.peachnet.edu!concert!decwrl!toad.com!gnu Wed May 12 12:34:17 1993
Path: msuinfo!agate!howland.reston.ans.net!darwin.sura.net!news-feed-1.peachnet.edu!concert!decwrl!toad.com!gnu
From: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Digital Privacy Group writes: Dear Mr. President
Message-ID: <34430@toad.com>
Date: 7 May 93 00:43:19 GMT
Organization: Cygnus Support, Palo Alto
Lines: 126

This letter to the President dated 5/6/93 on Cryptography and Clipper
Chip is from the digital privacy and security working group,
coordinated by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. PLEASE CIRCULATE
BROADLY. For further information, contact Jerry Berman,
jberman@eff.org, +1 202 544 9237.

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On April 16 you initiated a broad industry/government review of
privacy and cryptography policies. We applaud your efforts to develop a
greater understanding of these complex issues. With the end of the Cold
War and the rapid evolution of technology in the computer and
communications industries, a comprehensive review of our communications
security policies such as you have directed is sorely needed. As the world
becomes linked by a myriad of interconnected digital networks, and computer
and communications technologies converge, both government and the private
sector need to evaluate information security and privacy issues. Of course,
any overall policy must recognize the authorized law enforcement and
national security needs, and must evaluate the impact on American
competitiveness.

The Digital Privacy and Security Working Group -- a coalition of
communications and computer companies and associations, and consumer and
privacy advocates -- was formed almost a decade ago when Congress undertook
a review of technology and security policy. That review led to the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. Subsequently, many members
of the Working Group served on the Privacy and Technology Task Force that
Senator Leahy charged with examining these and similar issues in 1991.

While we recognize the importance of authorized national security
and law enforcement needs, we believe that there are fundamental privacy
and other constitutional rights that must be taken into account when any
domestic surveillance scheme is proposed. Moreover, it is unclear how your
proposal and the overall review of cryptography policy will impact on U.S.
export controls. Over the past two years, the Digital Privacy and Security
Working Group has held numerous meetings at which both public and private
sector representatives have exchanged technical and legal information with
the law enforcement community on just such issues.

In the White House press release of April 16, the Press Secretary
stated that you have "directed early and frequent consultations with
affected industries...and groups that advocate the privacy rights of
individuals..." Our group of over 50 members -- from computer software and
hardware firms, to telecommunications companies and energy companies, to
the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation
-- requests the opportunity to participate in developing policy on the
broad range of security and privacy issues being considered, including
appropriate encryption techniques. We believe that our membership has the
breadth and depth of expertise and experience that would allow us to
provide an excellent forum for the development of new policies in these
areas.
During the past few weeks, the Working Group has met several times
to identify issues that need to be addressed. Several aspects of the
Administration's encryption proposal warrant further discussion, including,
but not limited to:

o whether a key escrow system will produce the desired law
enforcement results;
o the level of strength and integrity of the algorithm and
the security of the key escrow system;
o the advisability of a government-developed and classified
algorithm;
o its practicality and commercial acceptability;
o the effect of the proposal on American competitiveness and
the balance of trade;
o possible implications for the development of digital
communications; and,
o the effect on the right to privacy and other constitutional
rights.

A detailed list of our questions relating to this subject is being prepared
to facilitate this dialogue.

We are making our views known to officials within your
Administration and Members of Congress as the review begins. We would
welcome the opportunity to participate in the review process and look
forward to working with you and your Administration on this important issue
in the coming months. Representatives of the Digital Privacy and Security
Working Group are anxious to meet with your staff at their earliest
convenience to establish a consultation process.

Sincerely,

abcd, The Microcomputer Industry Association
Hewlett-Packard Company
Advanced Network & Services, Inc.
IBM
American Civil Liberties Union
Information Technology Association of America
Apple Computer, Inc.
Information Industry Association
AT&T
Iris Associates
Business Software Alliance
Lotus Development Corporation
Cavanagh Associates, Inc.
McCaw Cellular Communications
Cellular Telephone Industry Association
MCI
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
Microsoft Corporation
Computer & Business Equipment Manufacturers Association
RSA Data Security, Inc.
Computer & Communications Industry Association
Software Publishers Association
Crest Industries, Inc.
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Digital Equipment Corporation
Toolmaker, Inc.
EDUCOM
Trusted Information Systems
Electronic Mail Association
United States Telephone Association

Electronic Frontier Foundation/Coordinator
Contact: Jerry Berman 202/544-9237
--
John Gilmore gnu@toad.com -- gnu@cygnus.com -- gnu@eff.org
"The Soviets believe that nothing -- like constitutional protection of
citizens' right to privacy -- must interfere with the security of the
state. ...We clearly do not want to change our societal standards to
theirs..." -- Adm. Stansfield Turner, ex-dir. CIA, _Secrecy and Democracy_

From msuinfo!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!mnemosyne.cs.du.edu!nyx!rclark Wed Jun 2 19:29:33 1993
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper,sci.crypt
Path: msuinfo!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!mnemosyne.cs.du.edu!nyx!rclark
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Subject: My letter to the President
Message-ID: <1993Jun2.071614.14024@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu>
Sender: usenet@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu (netnews admin account)
Organization: Nyx, Public Access Unix @ U. of Denver Math/CS dept.
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 07:16:14 GMT
Lines: 70
Xref: msuinfo alt.privacy.clipper:533 sci.crypt:16799

I oppose the Clipper chip vehemently. As the President, or the
duly authorized representative of the President, you will understand
that I find the idea that you will monitor my communications
reprehensible and intolerable.

You have espoused a policy of covert surveillance of
American citizens of which Bush would be proud. You, a protester
of the Vietnam War, who understands that the government can, and
should be opposed when it is wrong, should understand why privacy
is necessary to the people of any democracy, lest it cease to
be a democracy. Nevertheless, you approved the Clipper Chip proposal,
which is the furthest step backward that even a politician could take.
Shame on you! Even George Bush's father, Prescott Bush, who despised
and opposed Senator McCarthy's Communist witch-hunt, would loathe
such a retrogressive move!

We computer professionals, who supported your rise to power, feel
betrayed by your sudden reversal, by no means unique among your
sudden reversals. By siding with those who would rob Americans
of those freedoms which are our inalienable right, you have betrayed
democracy and made a sham of the Bill of Rights.

If, as a White House official suggested, criminalizing alternative,
secure encryption standards is an "option on the table," I am disgusted
by your betrayal. You, who seemed proud to have protested an unjust
war, and should understand why protest, even anonymous protest, should
be an inalienable right, have no right even to consider this as an
option.

If you consider criminalizing privacy, and encryption, you have
signed over the soul of the nation to be monitored at will by the
NSA and CIA, organizations which you, at one time in your life, opposed.
Perhaps, like many Sixties rebels, you have been bought by the
government, and no longer care about the rights of the American people.
It would not be the only time this has occurred.

While I doubt that you, the President, shall read this, perhaps some
subordinate shall. Perhaps, if the miraculous is possible, that
subordinate shall deem this worthy of your consideration.

While I am not used to pleading, I plead that you reconsider this
policy, which, if enacted, would doom privacy in the United States,
and turn this nation into the sort of nation that the Soviet Union
has finally decided not to be.

I beg that you consider, at least for a moment, the evil that you
may unleash. You may be motivated by an understandable concern for
the protection of the American people from drug dealers and mobsters,
but it is not the mobsters you shall crush in supporting the Clipper
chip. It is those eager, agile young minds who oppose the government
when it is wrong, and only wish to be able to have their voice,
without being monitored by the CIA and NSA in case that voice occasionally
is overly strident.

Thank you, Mr. President. I hope that you have carefully studied
the holy Consitution of this nation, which you have sworn to uphold.
I fear for the consequences if you have not.

Robert W. F. Clark
440 S. Franklin St.
Bloomfield, IN 47424
Telephone # (812) 384-3465
email addresses:
clark@metal.psu.edu
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu

--
----
Robert W. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu PGP signature available by mail or finger